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ARTICLE
WHAT IS SPORTS LAW?
TIMOTHY DAVIS
I. INTRODUCTION
What is "sports law" is a question often asked by students, academ-
ics, lawyers and lay persons. The person attempting to respond often
searches in vain for a response that is cogent and demonstrates some
modicum of understanding of "sports law." Perhaps the difficulty in ar-
ticulating a response is, in part, a result of uncertainty related to what
information is being sought. Is the "what is sports law" query intended
to focus our attention on the content of the practice of sports law? In
other words, which substantive areas of practice fall under the rubric of
sports law? Specifically, is the role of the sports lawyer intended as the
principal focus of the question? In this regard, perhaps what is sought is
information concerning the range of services provided by the attorney
who practices in the sports law context. Finally, perhaps the person who
asks "what is sports law" seeks an answer to a more fundamental consid-
eration - does such a thing as sports law exist? In other words, is sports
law recognized as an independent substantive area of the law such as
torts, contracts or employment law?
I will attempt to focus on each of these questions beginning with the
last inquiry first: does sports law represent an independent corpus of
law? I will also explore the relevance of attempts to resolve the issue. Is
determining whether sports law is a field of law merely a matter of aca-
demic curiosity or a matter imbued with broader implications?
II. "SPORTS LAW" OR "SPORTS AND THE LAW?"
A. The Debate
Those engaged in the debate concerning whether sports law consti-
tutes a substantive area of law tend to adopt one of three positions: 1) no
separately identifiable body of law exists that can be designated as sports
law and the possibility that such a corpus of law will ever develop is
extremely remote; 2) although sports law does not presently represent a
separately identifiable substantive area of law, recent developments sug-
gest that in the near future it will warrant such recognition; or 3) a body
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of law presently exists that can appropriately be designated as sports law.
I turn initially to a discussion of the views of those who adhere to the
first of these three positions.
1. The Traditional View: "Sports Law" Does Not Exist
The traditional view is that sports law represents nothing more than
an amalgamation of various substantive areas of the law that are rele-
vant in the sports context. According to this perspective, the term sports
law is a misnomer given that sport represents a form of activity and en-
tertainment that is governed by the legal system in its entirety.' Notes
one commentator, "I have often said there is no such thing as sports law.
Instead it is the application to sport situations of disciplines such as con-
tract law, administrative law ... , competition law, intellectual property
law, defamation and employment law... [R]emember there is no such
thing as sports law."2 Adopting this sentiment, the authors of a leading
"sports law" textbook propose that "the term 'sports law' is somewhat
misleading. In reality, sports law is nothing more or less than law as
applied to the sports industry."3 In elaborating, these authors state that
"the study of 'sports law' does not involve an entirely unique or discrete
body of special principles divorced from traditional legal concepts."4 In
sum, adherents to the traditional perspective argue that "sports law sim-
ply entails the application of basic legal precepts to a specific industry"
that are drawn from other substantive areas of the law.5 Consequently,
no separately identifiable body of law exists that can be characterized as
sports law.
2. The Moderate Position: "Sports Law" May Develop Into a Field
of Law
Other commentators have begun increasingly to question the tradi-
tional view that no corpus of law exists that can be characterized as an
independent field of law called sports law. Amongst the critics of the
traditional view, are those who have staked out what represents a middle
ground. Professor Kenneth Shropshire acknowledges that develop-
ments, such as state and federal legislation impacting sports (for exam-
ple, state statutes regulating sports agents, and federal statutes such as
1. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW (1993).
2. SINION GARDINER, ET AL., SPORTS LAW 71 (1998) (quoting C. Woodhouse, The Lawyer
in Sport: Some Reflections, 4 (3) SPORT AND THE LAW J. 14 (1996)).
3. MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO & MARK S. LEVINSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 5 (1997).
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id.
[Vol. 11:211
WHAT IS SPORTS LAW?
Title IX), suggest a "growing sports-only corpus" of law.6 Professor
Shropshire concludes, however, that the body of sports-only law has not
reached a point of maturation such that a "unique substantive corpus"
exists that can be categorized as sports law.7 Consequently, he believes
it is more appropriate to apply the "sports and the law" rather than the
"sports law" designation to legal matters that arise in the sports context.8
Another adherent to the moderate position is Professor Burlette
Carter who argues that sports law is in the midst of an exciting, yet chal-
lenging, transformative process.9 According to Professor Carter, this
process parallels the increased focus by law schools on sports, and the
growing significance of sports regulation to participants, organizations
and communities. 10 She believes that these developments will better
shape the contours of this emerging field of study." This in turn, will
eventually transform sports law from "a course without a corpus" to a
widely recognized independent substantive area of law.12
Similar sentiments were expressed in the groundbreaking treatise au-
thored by John Weistart and Cym Lowell - The Law of Sports.'3
Therein, the authors addressed the following question: "Is there really
any such thing as 'the law of sports?"" 4 At the outset, they noted the
hypothesis expressed by traditionalists that no such thing exists as sports
law since there is no body of law unique to sports.' Writing in late
1970s, they observed, however, that based upon their research
it soon became clear that there were many areas in which sports-
related problems required a specially focused analysis. On some
matters, there are legal doctrines which apply in the sports area
and nowhere else. This is the case, for example, with respect to
such diverse matters as baseball's antitrust exemption and some
of the tax rules to be applied to the recapture of depreciation on
player contracts. 16
6. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Introduction: Sports Law?, 35 Am. Bus. L.J. 181, 182 (1998).
7. Id.
8. Id.





13. JomN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS (1979).
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Weistart and Lowell also identified another phenomenon that might
lend credence to the notion of the existence of sports law as a field of
study. They noted factual peculiarities residing in sports that require the
unique application of generally applicable legal doctrine and thus pro-
duce results that would not occur in other contexts. They provide exam-
ples drawn from amateur and professional sports:
In the area of amateur sports, for example, the proscription
against sex discrimination is based on the same political and soci-
ological notions which have led to statutes and court decisions
outlawing sex discrimination in employment, housing, and public
benefits. However, none of these areas raise the issues (and ten-
sions) which are posed by the significant differences in the reve-
nue-generating potentials of traditional men's and women's
sports.... Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act do not contain
different language to be applied in sports cases. In that sense,
then, the law relevant to the sports industry is the same as will be
applied to other areas of commerce. A glance at the cases, how-
ever, will guggest that there is a good deal of judicial reasoning in
the sports areas which is not very conventional.' 7
Weistart and Lowell conclude their analysis by emphasizing areas in
which the factual uniqueness of sports problems require specialized anal-
ysis. In this regard, they caution courts to take care in drawing analo-
gies. Thus, while not expressly adopting the position that recognizes the
existence of a course of study called sports law, Weistart and Lowell
strongly suggest that two phenomena, the unique application of legal
doctrine to the sports context and the factual uniqueness of sports
problems that require the need for specialized analysis, support the no-
tion that a body of law called sports law might exist.18
3. "Sports Law": A Separate Field of Law
Finally, I examine the views of those who argue that sports law cur-
rently exists as a field of law. Adherents to this view emphasize the
growing body of case and statutory law specific to the sports industry as
evidence of the existence of a separately identifiable body of law.19 A
leading advocate of this perspective is a British scholar, Simon Gardiner,
who also demonstrates that the "sports law" or "sports and the law" de-
bate has not been confined to the United States. Pointing to the increas-
17. Id. at xviii-xix.
18. Id. at xix.
19. Martin Greenberg, Foreword to GARDNER, supra note 2, at vii.
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ing body of judicial and legislative law specific to sports, Professor
Gardiner argues that
[I]t is true to say that [sports law] is largely an amalgam of inter-
related legal disciplines involving such areas as contract, taxation,
employment, competition and criminal law but dedicated legisla-
tion and case law has developed and will continue to do so. As an
area of academic study and extensive practitioner involvement,
the time is right to accept that a new legal area has been born -
sports law.20
Commentators also propose that references to sports law as merely
an amalgamation of various other substantive areas of the law ignores an
important present day reality - very few substantive areas of the law fit
into separate categories that are divorced from and independent of other
substantive areas of the law.21 Doctrinal overlap exists not only within
sports law, but within other areas of law as well. According to Professor
Carter, "the field of sports law has moved beyond the traditional anti-
trust and labor law boundaries into sports representation and legal eth-
ics, sports and corporate structure, sports and disability, sports and race,
sports and gender, sports and taxation, international issues in sports law
and numerous other permutations."'22
Proponents of the sports law designation and those sympathetic to
the view, also argue that reticence to recognize sports law as a specific
body of law may reflect attitudes regarding the intellectual seriousness of
sports. In this regard, they emphasize the tendency to marginalize the
study of sports rather than treat it as any other form of business.23 The
intellectual marginalization of sport has been attributed, in part, to the
belief that social relations extant in sports were not deemed proper sub-
jects for reconstruction into legal relationships.24 Thus, private and pub-
lie law were considered "inappropriate [mechanisms for] controlling the
social norms of sport."'  The competing and increasingly predominant
20. GARDINER, supra note 2, at 74.
21. Carter, supra note 9, at 243.
22. Id. at 239. See also id. at 239-40 n.21. Professor Carter adds that the interdisciplinary
character of sports law has, in part, triggered the ongoing debate over the proper characteriza-
tion of the field. Id. at 239.
23. Id. at 241 (noting that such inaccurate characterizations of sports underlie the majority
opinion in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), in which the Su-
preme Court concluded that baseball was entertainment rather than business and, therefore,
was neither commerce nor subject to antitrust laws).
24. GARDINER, supra note 2, at 45.
25. Id. (quoting K. Foster, Developments in Sporting Law, in THm CHANGING POLITICS OF
SPORT (L. Allison ed., 1993)). Professor Gardiner adds that "in the past, sport has been seen
2001]
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view, however, casts sports as a significant economic activity suitable,
like other big businesses, to regulation whether it be self or external.26
Notes Professor Carter:
The historical conception of sports law within the general realm
of legal matters - the treatment of this field as not on par with
other forms of legal practice - derives from our general assump-
tions about the nature of sport itself and the athletes who partici-
pate in it. The notion is that sport is not like business; it is merely
entertainment.27
Professor Carter's conclusion that sport, notwithstanding such earlier as-
sumptions, "is now a business,"' finds validation in numerous ways. For
example, a 1998 issue of The Nation, the first issue in the magazine's
history to focus on sports, assigned a figure of $350 billion to what the
editor characterized as the gross national sports product.2 9
B. Factors for Evaluating What Constitutes a Field of Law
The debate concerning sports is not extraordinary given that ques-
tions regarding the substantive legitimacy of new fields of law are quite
common.30 For instance, similar controversy has accompanied the devel-
opment of other new fields of law such as computer law.3' In a treatise
on computer law, its author acknowledges that computer law is not a
body of law, like contract or tort law, but rather is comprised of a collec-
tion of legal doctrine.32 Nevertheless, the author argues that it should be
recognized as a specific body of law given that this collection of legal
doctrine shares a common feature - "they have all been created or al-
tered by the emergence of computer technology. '33 He gives two addi-
tional reasons for recognizing computer law as a field of law: first,
computers have unique characteristics that substantive areas such as
contracts have not addressed, and second, computers have "far-reaching
effects" on society.34
as an area of social life that was removed from normal everyday life and as such should be
treated as a separate area largely excluded from legal intervention." Id. at 66.
26. Id. at 45.
27. Carter, supra note 9, at 241.
28. Id. at 242.
29. Why Sports?, NATION, Aug. 10, 1998, available at 1998 WL 11637697.
30. GArDINER, supra note 2, at 73.
31. See, e.g., Peter W. Hohenhaus, An Introductory Perspective on Computer Law: Is It,
Should It Be, and How Do We Best Develop It As, Separate Discipline?, 1991 WL 330761
(addressing whether computer law is a separate discipline within the law).




WHAT IS SPORTS LAW?
Likewise, before they gained recognition as specific fields of study,
bodies of law as diverse as labor law,35 health law,36 and environmental
law37 endured similar fates. Indeed, the process of recognizing a new
legal category has been characterized as slow moving because it signifies
the occurrence of a fundamental change in society.38 Inherent in this
transformative process is the development of new patterns of behavior
and cooperation that seek common acceptance. 9
Several academic and practical factors may provide indicia that an
area has matured to the point of common acceptance. These include the
following:
1. Unique application by courts of law from other disciplines to a
specific context;40
2. factual peculiarities within a specific context that produce
problems requiring specialized analysis;4'
3. "issues involving the proposed discipline's subject matter must
arise in multiple, existing, common law or statutory areas; '42
4. "vithin the proposed discipline, [the] elements of its subject mat-
ter must connect, interact, or interrelate;"'43
5. decisions Wvithin the proposed discipline conflict With decisions in
other areas of the law and decisions regarding a matter within the
proposed discipline impact another matter within the discipline;"*
35. Thomas C. Kohler, The Disintegration of Labor Law: Some Notes for a Comparative
Study of Legal Transformation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1311, 1318-20 (1998) (noting how in
the 1920s, labor law struggled as a new legal order to come into its own); Gail Crummie
Washington, Entertainment Law: Is There Such an Animal and Could There Be One in Ala-
bama?, 53 ALA. LAW. 400 (Nov. 1992) (examining the question: what is entertainment law?).
36. CLARK C. HAViGHRST, HEALTH CAPE LAW AND PoLICY 1-2 (1988) (arguing that
health care qualifies as a separate body of law notwithstanding the fact that larger bodies of
law and statutes not exclusive to health "impinges upon health care providers and patients [so
as to] warrant separate study." Indeed, the author argues that the various sources of law that
govern health care law, rather than from its status as a field of law, makes it an excellent
forum within which to view the law in action).
37. SIMON BALL & STuART BELL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5 (1991) (arguing in 1991 that
environmental law in Britain was beginning to develop as an independent area of law because
it began to "acquire its own conceptual apparatus, in the sense that there is being built up a set
of principles and concepts which can be said to exist across the range of subjects covered").
38. Kohler, supra note 35, at 1322.
39. Id.
40. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 13, at xix.
41. Id.
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6. "the proposed discipline must significantly affect the nation's (or
the world's) business, economy, culture, or society;"'45
7. the development of interventionist legislation to regulate specific
relationships;4
6
8. publication of legal casebooks that focus on the proposed
discipline;47
9. development of law journals and other publications specifically
devoted to publishing writings that fall within the parameters of
the proposed field;41
10. acceptance of the proposed field by law schools; and,
11. recognition by legal associations, such as bar associations, of the
proposed field as a separately identifiable substantive area of the
law.
Although these factors provide guidance, meticulous analysis of them
may not yield a definitive answer to the question under consideration -
is sports law a field of study? Whether a specific body of law should be
recognized as such is an inexact science. Notes Professor Gardiner,
[t]he process by which legal areas are identified, constituted and
named is a complex one and often to some extent arbitrary.
There is no official recognition procedure. It is a process of legal
practitioners and academics recognizing the growing application
of the law to a new area of social life.49
In the end, whether sports law is recognized as an independent field
of law may turn on the perceptions of those who practice, teach and
engage in scholarship related to sports law. Professor Carter asks that
we consider the following:
But what makes a field a field? The answer is that a field be-
comes a field not because it is inherently so but because in our
public legal dealings we shape it as such, defining the concepts
and legal norms that vill prevail uniquely in that context. It be-
comes a field because enough people with power on all sides are
so affected by it to require some special treatment of it in the law.
For many years, sports law has been somewhat removed from the
things that make a field a field - the litigation that establishes a
45. Id.
46. Kohler, supra note 35, at 1319.
47. Id. at 1320 (noting the publication of a casebook on labor law was one of the clearest
signs of its emergence as a legal field). Part VI., infra, contains a list of sports law casebooks.
48. Part VI., infra, contains a listing of journals specifically geared towards publishing
commentary regarding sports related legal matters.
49. GARDINER, supra note 2, at 73.
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common law specific to the concerns of the participants, the
scholarship that provides conceptual and theoretical guidance
(and sometimes misguidance), and the legislative and administra-
tive action that creates a statutory and regulatory base.50
III. SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF LAW IMPLICATED BY SPnRTS
Whether or not sports law represents a separate corpus of law, few
would deny that it touches diverse substantive areas of law. Indeed, the
challenge and the opportunity for the attorney who handles sports re-
lated matters are derived in large measure from the diverse substantive
areas that sports law encompasses. As cogently expressed by one
scholar, "[s]ports law, with its wide variety of legal aspects, probably en-
compasses more areas of the law than any other legal discipline."'" The
following discussion attempts to illustrate how the "sports industry inter-
sects the law at every cross."52 It also provides illustrations of and cita-
tions to cases that may someday be considered historically significant in
the emergence of sports law as a field of law even though subsequent
developments may have lessened their precedential value.
A. Contract Law
Despite having been displaced considerably by antitrust and labor
law as it relates to defining relationships, contract law retains a vitally
important role in the business of sports. 3 Collective bargaining agree-
ments (CBAs) are largely governed by labor law principles. Neverthe-
less, contract law principles retain their importance with respect to the
interpretation and application of the terms of CBAs.54 Moreover, free-
dom of contract is one of the fundamental premises underlying the justi-
fication for CBAs.55
In addition, contract principles remain relevant with respect to terms
of player/team contracts that are open to individualized negotiation, not-
50. Carter, supra note 9, at 244-45.
51. Robert P. Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, or Is It a Player Agent,
Player Representative, Sports Agent, Contract Advisor, Family Advisor or Contract Representa-
tive?, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 14 (1994); see also CoZZILLIo & LEvINSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 5; WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 13, at xix; Greenberg, supra note 19, at vii.
52. Greenberg, supra note 19, at vii.
53. Timothy Davis, Balancing Freedom of Contract and Competing Values in Sports, 38 S.
TEx. L. REv. 1115, 1134-35 (1997).
54. Id. at 1135-36.
55. Wood v. National Basketball Association, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (1987) ("Freedom of con-
tract is an important cornerstone of national labor policy...)
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withstanding uniform player contracts in the major team sports.56 For
example, in professional football the following are provisions that are
subject to individualized negotiation:
a. The amount of a signing or reporting bonus.
b. The time of payment of bonus.
c. The desirability of a loan.
d. The length of the contractual relationship.
e. Skill or injury guarantees.
f. Function of initial-year salary and annual increments.
g. The importance of final year salary.
h. Option clauses.
i. Salary adjustment agreements.
j. Roster bonuses.
k. Individual and team incentives.57
Beyond player/team agreements, principles of contract law are
relevant to the creation, formation and enforcement of a wide variety of
agreements that are struck in the sports world. These include
endorsement contracts, coach/team contracts, arena lease agreements,
and student-athlete/university scholarship agreements and letters of
intent.5s
The vast array of sports related matters to which contract principles
are relevant produces an equally vast array of disputes, the outcome of
which often turns on the application of general contract principles.
Thus, courts have relied upon familiar contract law concepts such as the
doctrine of consideration, the parol evidence rule, the statute of frauds,
and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in resolving disputes
related to the forgoing types of sports related contracts. Set forth below
are several illustrations, gleaned from countless examples, of key cases in
the development of a jurisprudence of sports law that apply contract law
principles to the sports context.
56. 1 MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACrICE 333 (2d. ed.
1998).
57. Id. at 333-34 (quoting Steinberg, Negotiating Contracts in the National Football
League, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEuR SPORTS 6-4 (G. Uberstein ed., release #2
(1991))).
58. See generally GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 56.
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1. Player Contracts
a. Interpretation
Sample v. Gotham Football Club, Inc.: A former professional foot-
ball player sought to recover, inter alia, for breach of a personal services
contract.60 The parties requested the court to determine "whether the
simultaneous execution of several instruments result[ed] in one contract
or several separate agreements."'" Applying contractual rules of inter-
pretation, the court found that the proper characterization of the docu-
ment must be "ascertained from a reading of the several instruments,
and [examining] the facts and circumstances at the time of execution of
the contract.62
b. Breach and Remedy
Boston Celtics Ltd. Partnership. v. Shaw:63 The Boston Celtics, a pro-
fessional basketball team, sought enforcement of an arbitrator's decision
that a player be required to fulfill his promise to exercise his contractual
right to cancel the second year of his contract with an Italian team.64
The cancellation of his contract with the Italian team would have al-
lowed Shaw to compete for the Celtics.65 Finding that the arbitrator ac-
ted within the scope of his authority, the First Circuit upheld the district
court's granting of a preliminary injunction.66 It upheld the arbitrator's
decision that the player's promise was proper under the terms of the
National Basketball Association (NBA) CBA and had a plausible ba-
sis.67 Finally, the court rejected the player's argument that the unclean
hands and unconscionability doctrines precluded the court from granting
injunctive relief on behalf of the team.68
2. Coaching Contracts
Deli v. University of Minnesota:69 Deli, a former University of Minne-
sota gymnastics coach sued the institution seeking recovery based, inter
59. 59 F.R.D. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
60. Id. at 162.
61. Id. at 164
62. Id.
63. 908 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1990).
64. Id. at 1043.
65. Id. at 1047.
66. Id. at 1049.
67. Id. at 1045.
68. 908 F.2d at 1049.
69. 578 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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alia, upon promissory estoppel regarding certain oral promises made by
the athletic director. 70 The court defined promissory estoppel as sound-
ing in contract. 7' Consequently, extra-contractual damages such as those
arising from emotional distress were held to be non-recoverable under
promissory estoppel absent a specific statutory provision permitting such
recovery or the existence of an independent tort.72
Rodgers v. Georgia Tech Athletic Association:73 In a former head
football coach's "breach of contract action against [an athletic associa-
tion] to recover the value of certain perquisites that had been made
available to him as the head coach,"'74 a state appellate court applied
several fundamental principles of contract law, including: 1) an em-
ployee may be entitled to damages for breach of contract, but ordinarily
"has no right to recover [his] position and title;"'75 2) upon a wrongful
termination, an employer is obligated to pay an employee the amount
set forth in the contract that the employee was to receive as compensa-
tion for his services;76 3) the perquisites to which a discharged employee
is entitled to recover requires a determination of the intention of the
parties to the employment contract;77 4) where a contract is "susceptible
of two constructions, that interpretation which is least favorable to the
author should generally be accepted; '78 5) upon breach of an employ-
ment contract, damages should be measured by the "actual loss sus-
tained by the breach, and not the gross amount due under the
contract; '79 and 6) "a party is entitled to recover profits that would have
resulted from a breach of a contract... where the breach is the result of
the other party's fault," and where the profits were within the contem-
plation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract.8 0 Apply-
ing the foregoing principles, the court concluded that the coach was
entitled to recover certain perquisites, namely those to which he was en-
titled by virtue of his position as head football coach.
70. Id. at 781.
71. Id. at 782.
72. Id. at 782-83.
73. 303 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
74. Id. at 469.
75. Id. at 470.
76. Id. at 471 (quoting South Cotton Oil Co. v. Yarborough, 107 S.E. 366, 368 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1921)).
77. Id.
78. 303 S.E.2d at 471 (quoting Bridges v. Home Guano Co., 125 S.E. 872, 873 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1924)).
79. Id. at 472 (quoting South Cotton Oil Co., 107 S.E. at 368).
80. Id. at 473.
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Vanderbilt University. v. DiNardo:8' The university brought a breach
of contract action against its former head football coach when he re-
signed to become football coach for Louisiana State University.' Van-
derbilt sought monetary relief pursuant to a clause providing that the
university was entitled to damages in the event the defendant left the
university to become coach at another school before the expiration of his
contract term.83 The district court awarded damages, pursuant to the
clause, in the amount of $281,886.43.84 Applying contract analysis re-
garding liquidated damages provisions, the Sixth Circuit upheld the
clause as an enforceable liquidated damages provision."5 In so doing, it
rejected defendant's characterization of the clause as a penalty or as a
"disguised overly broad non-compete provision." 86 The court found that
the district court's use of "a formula based on DiNardo's salary to calcu-
late liquidated damages was reasonable given the nature of the unquan-
tifiable damages in the case."87 The court noted that "Vanderbilt hired
DiNardo for a unique and specialized position, and the parties under-
stood that the amount of damages could not be easily ascertained should
a breach occur."88
3. Individual Sports
Rooney v. Tyson:89 The Court of Appeals of New York was requested
upon certification of a question from the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to determine whether an oral professional services contract pursu-
ant to which a boxer promised to retain his trainer "for as long as the
boxer fights professionally" might constitute a contract for a definite du-
ration and thus avoid the strictures of the employment at-will doctrine.9 °
The court ruled that the pertinent language created a contract for a defi-
nite duration, the length of which would be defined by the commence-
ment and conclusion of the boxer's career. 91
81. 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999).
82. Id. at 753.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 755-57.
86. 174 F.3d at 755, 757.
87. Id. at 755.
88. Id. at 757.
89. 697 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1998).
90. Id. at 572.
91. Id. at 575.
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4. Student-Athlete/University Relationship
Jackson v. Drake University:9 2 A former student-athlete sued Drake
University alleging, among other things, breach of contract in that the
school failed to provide him with an opportunity to develop his athletic
skills through participation in intercollegiate competition. The court re-
jected the breach of contract claim as a consequence of its refusal to
imply a right to play basketball into the agreement.93 The court's ruling
was premised on the classical contract rule, which provides that "where
the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous," the express terms
control and additional obligations will not be imposed pursuant to
implication.94
Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n:95 A former student-
athlete sought workers compensation benefits from Texas Christian Uni-
versity (TCU) for a spinal cord injury that he incurred during a football
game in which he played for TCU.96 In affirming a jury's verdict in favor
of TCU, the court held as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not an
employee of the college when he played football. 7 The court rejected
Waldrep's argument that the Letter of Intent and Financial Aid Agree-
ment he signed constituted an express contract of hire.98 In rejecting
plaintiff's contention, the court relied on the contract principle that "the
most basic policy of contract law ... is the protection of the justified
expectations of the parties." 99 Analyzing these documents in the context
of "the background of circumstances surrounding [their] execution,"10
the court concluded the facts revealed the intent of the parties was that
Waldrep was an amateur and not a professional. 1 1
5. Agent/Player Relationship
Zinn v. Parrish: 2 In a dispute between an agent and a player, the
court found that the contract established the standard for assessing the
92. 778 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
93. Id. at 1493.
94. Id.
95. 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000).
96. Id. at 696.
97. Id. at 702.
98. Id. at 698.
99. Id. at 699 (quoting DeSantis v. Wakenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990)).
100. 21 S.W.3d at 699 (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 395 S.W.2d 701,702 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1965)).
101. Id.
102. 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981).
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agent's competency as one of reasonable effort. 103 The court also ap-
plied a good faith standard to agent services not governed by the con-
tractually established standard of care.'"
B. Labor Law
With the exception of soccer, players in all of the major team sports
in the United States are represented by labor unions. Because of this,
labor law and antitrust law have emerged to impact significantly the law
that governs teams sports in the United States. Two commentators note,
"[i]n the three decades of active union representation in professional
sports, this process has produced decisions that illustrate virtually all the
important doctrinal spheres in contemporary labor law."' 0 5 These au-
thors further note the development of a "distinctive jurisprudence that
has evolved for sports labor relations."'0 6 This distinct jurisprudence is
an outgrowth of judicial resolution of disputes ranging from certification
of player's bargaining units, to the exclusivity of a union's bargaining
authority, to whether parties governed by a CBA have bargained in good
faith.
Delineated below are illustrations of disputes in sports that have im-
plicated general labor law principles so as to contribute to the develop-
ment of a labor law jurisprudence for sports.
1. Intersection of Labor and Antitrust
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: ° Professional football players, who
were assigned to developmental squads of substitute players, brought an
antitrust suit against football club owners challenging the latter's unilat-
eral imposition of a fixed salary after a good faith impasse in contract
negotiations. 08 The Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' antitrust claims
inasmuch as the owners' conduct fell within the scope of the "non-statu-
tory" labor exemption to antitrust liability.0 9 Specifically, the Court held
that given that the owners' action occurred "during and immediately af-
ter a collective bargaining negotiation," and was an integral part of the
103. Id. at 366.
104. Id.
105. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND Th LAW 240 (2d. ed. 1998).
106. Id.
107. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
108. Id. at 233-35.
109. Id. at 235.
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bargaining process, the "non-statutory" labor exemption was
applicable."'
2. Good Faith Bargaining
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee,
Inc.:"' A federal district court refused to impute statements regarding
an inability to pay higher salaries made by Major League Baseball's
commissioner and club officials to the clubs' bargaining committee,
which had the exclusive authority to engage in collective bargaining on
behalf of clubs. The refusal to impute such statements rendered inappli-
cable the general principle that employers cannot in good faith claim
financial inability to pay higher salaries and then refuse to produce fi-
nancial data to support such assertions.
3. Exclusive Bargaining
North American Soccer League v. NLRB:"12 "Professional soccer
league sought review of NLRB finding of unfair labor practice[s]."" 3
The court held that the soccer clubs and the league were joint employ-
ers.1 4 The collective bargaining unit was appropriate and did not de-
prive the clubs of due process.1 5
4. Grievance Arbitration
Sharpe v. National Football League Players Ass'n:"6 Former profes-
sional football player sought recovery from players union alleging
breach of fair representation by the union. 1 7 The contract between the
player and club stipulated that any contractual disputes between the par-
ties would be submitted to binding arbitration according to the terms of
the National Football League (NFL) CBA." 8 Due to this contract lan-
guage and the inextricably interdependent relationship between claims
alleging an employer's breach of a CBA and a union's breach of fair
representation, the court granted the union's motion to dismiss." 9 It
110. Id. at 250.
111. 516 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
112. 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1382-83.
115. Id. at 1384.
116. 941 F. Supp. 8 (D.C. 1996).
117. Id. at 9.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 10.
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specifically found that a player must have received an adverse decision
from an arbitrator before the court could entertain the player's breach of
fair representation claim.'2 °
Morris v. New York Football Giants, Inc.:21 Professional football
players brought actions against teams claiming they were entitled to
compensation of 10% of the contract amount when the players were re-
leased before the season began.' 22 The court held that the CBA had
expired."z Nevertheless it held that pursuant to the players' individual
contracts, they were required to submit disputes to arbitration. 2 4 In
reaching this result, the court rejected the players' assertion that the ar-
bitration clause should be deemed an unenforceable adhesion contract
due to the players' inability to negotiate any terms other than those in-
volving compensation and duration."z The court found that the arbitra-
tion clause was not an adhesion contract for the following reasons: 1)
plaintiffs' status as highly paid, sophisticated professional athletes with
considerable bargaining power; 2) plaintiffs' representation by exper-
ienced agents and/or counsel; 3) the lack of evidence of attempts by
plaintiffs to negotiate regarding the arbitration provision; 4) the conspic-
uousness of the arbitration clause; and, 5) the lack of evidence unreason-
ably favorable to the defendants. 26
C. Antitrust Law
Since 1970, antitrust law and in particular, the Sherman Act, have
severely impacted the structure of relationships in professional sports.12 7
Notwithstanding baseball, which was deemed exempt from antitrust
laws, antitrust emerged as a force that weakened the restrictive rules and
regulations that afforded team owners greater leverage in their relation-
ships with players. Set forth below are illustrations of several instances
in which antitrust law has impacted legal relationships in sports.
120. Id.
121. 575 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1991).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1015.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 575 N.Y.S.2d at 1015-16.
127. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 56, at 3.
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1. Professional Sports
a. Reserve System
Flood v. Kuhn: 28 A professional baseball player alleged that Major
League Baseball's player reserve system violated federal antitrust
laws. 129 Applying the judicially constructed baseball exemption to anti-
trust laws, the Court rejected the player's claim.'3 ° The Court also con-
cluded that due to Congressional acquiescence in the longstanding
exemption, Congress, not the Court, was the proper body to change the
exemption and to remedy any "inconsistency and illogic" that it
produces.' 31
b. Free Agency
Mackey v. NFL:132 Players challenged the National Football League's
rule requiring a club to compensate a player's former club for acquiring
the player as a free agent.' 33 The court found that the league's con-
straint on player mobility constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.' 34 The court refused to apply the non-
statutory labor exemption to antitrust laws notwithstanding the existence
of a CBA. 3 5 The court created a three-prong test for determining when
federal labor policy should be given preeminence over antitrust laws: 1)
where the restraint primarily affects only parties to the collective bar-
gaining relationship; 2) the subject restraint concerns matters that are
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining; and 3) the agreement is a
product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. 136 Applying the test to the
facts before it, the court rendered the exemption inapplicable since the
league and its players did not engage in arm's length negotiations re-
garding the restraint (known as the Rozelle Rule which required com-
pensation for signing of free agents). 37
128. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
129. Id. at 265.
130. Id. at 285.
131. Id. at 284.
132. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 609.
134. Id. at 623.
135. Id. at 616, 623.
136. Id. at 614.
137. 543 F.2d at 616.
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c. Franchise Relocation
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (Raiders 1):138
An NFL rule requiring three-fourths of its member teams to approve a
franchise's moving into another team's territory was challenged as an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.' 39 In
holding that the NFL was subject to antitrust liability, the court found
that the league was not a single entity and therefore could be found to
have conspired in restraint of trade.140
d. Television Contracts
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership. v. NBA: 141 The Chi-
cago Bulls professional basketball team and television superstation
WGN, challenged, as a violation of the Sherman Act, an NBA rule that
limited the number of games that the station could carry.'4 The court
held that the Sports Broadcasting Act did not preclude the 20-game rule
from violating the Sherman Act.1 43 Concluding that the NBA consti-
tutes a joint venture rather than a single entity, the court adopted the
Rule of Reason as the framework within which to assess the legality of
the 20-game rule which limited output.'" In finding a violation of the
Sherman Act, the court was unswayed by NBA proffered justifications
that the restriction prevents clubs from misappropriating the NBA's
property right to exploit its symbols and success, and that it prevented
"free-riding."' 145
2. College Sports
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents'46 Members of
the College Football Association brought an antitrust action challenging
the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) plan for televis-
ing college football games as violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act.147
The Court held that the plan constituted a restraint of trade in that it
limited the "members' freedom to negotiate and enter into their own
138. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Id. at 1385.
140. Id. at 1401.
141. 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 669.
143. Id. at 667.
144. Id. at 673.
145. Id. at 675-76.
146. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
147. ld. at 88.
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television contracts."' 48 The Court further held, however, that the plan
would violate the Sherman Act only if it constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade.' 49 Rejecting the application of a per se rule of analy-
sis, the Court nevertheless found the restraint unreasonable pursuant to
a Rule of Reason analysis.' 50 In often cited dictum, the Court also stated
"[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the
NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur
athletic teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance pub-
lic interest in intercollegiate athletics."15'
Law v. NCAA: 52 This class action suit brought by college basketball
coaches with "restricted earnings" status challenged an NCAA rule that
capped their annual compensation at $12,000 during the academic term
and $4,000 during the summer. 5 3 Applying a "quick look rule of rea-
son" analysis, the court concluded that the limitation on compensation
had "obvious anticompetitive" effects and thus violated the Sherman
Act since it artificially lowered the price of coaching services. 154 The
court was not persuaded by the three justifications offered by the
NCAA: cost reduction, maintaining competitive equity and providing
opportunities for younger coaches.1 55
D. Tort Law
Generally, tort principles applicable in other contexts are equally ap-
plicable in sports settings. Nevertheless, because of the unique charac-
teristics of sports, the application of certain tort doctrine is imbued with
difficulty such as in cases of tort liability stemming from on-the-field
conduct. In this regard, Weller and Roberts state:
Sports, however, pose a unique problem to the law of personal
injury. The aim of a sporting event is to produce spirited athletic
competition on the field or floor. In sports such as boxing, foot-
ball, and hockey, a central feature of the contest is the infliction
of violent contact on the opponent. In other sports, such as bas-
ketball and baseball, such contact is an expected risk, if not a de-
sired outcome, of intense competition. Even sports such as golf
that are intrinsically non-violent for their participants may inflict
148. Id. at 98.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 113.
151. 468 U.S. at 117.
152. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
153. Id. at 1014-15.
154. Id. at 1020.
155. Id. at 1021-24.
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harmful contacts upon the spectators. This characteristic feature
of sports requires the law to undertake a delicate balancing act
when it tailors for use in sports litigation the standards of liability
developed to govern relationships in very different aspects of
life.156
This quote reveals that tort represents another area in which a dis-
tinctive jurisprudence is developing in the sports context. Illustrations of
the jurisprudence of personal injury in sports include:
1. Liability for Player-to-Player Conduct'57
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.:15" A professional football
player sought recovery for injuries sustained when a player intentionally
struck him during a game.159 The court was asked to consider whether
general principles of law that govern liability for the infliction of injuries
were inapplicable in instances where the injury occurs in the course of a
game. 160 Rejecting the lower court's reasoning, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that "there are no principles of law which allow a court to rule
out certain tortious conduct by reason of general roughness of the game
or difficulty of administering it.' 161 It adopted recklessness as the
proper standard for measuring liability in this context. 62
Nabozny v. Barnhill:'63 A goaltender of a soccer team brought a tort
action for an injury sustained during a soccer match."64 The court articu-
lated the general rule that "in the sports context, a player is liable in a
tort action for injury if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate,
willful or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player.' '1 65
It also held on the facts before it that where a safety rule is contained in
a set of rules governing conduct of an athletic activity, a participant who
is trained and coached by knowledgeable personnel is charged with a
duty to refrain from engaging in the activities proscribed by the rule.166
156. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 105, at 934-35.
157. In addition to cases cited in this section, see discussion of Lilley v. Elk Grove Unified
School District, infra Part III. D.2.
158. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
159. Id. at 518.
160. Id. at 519.
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id. at 524.
163. 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
164. Id. at 259.
165. Id. at 261.
166. Id. at 260-61.
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2. Assumption of the Risk
Lilley v. Elk Grove Unified School District.'67 A student, who broke
an arm while participating in extracurricular wrestling, sued his middle
school for negligence.'6 Finding that the lower court had granted sum-
mary judgment based upon the principle that primary assumption of the
risk operated as a complete defense to a negligence claim, the court held
that injury is an inherent risk of wrestling.169 The court reasoned
"[i]mposition of a duty to protect student athletes from any risk inherent
in a sport like wrestling would fundamentally alter the nature of the
sport and, in some instances, effectively preclude participation alto-
gether because the threat of liability would make schools reluctant to
offer sports as an extracurricular activity."'170 In reaching the foregoing
conclusion, the court found that the following facts did not preclude ap-
plication of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine: injury to the
plaintiff while participating in a demonstration with an instructor, and
the existence of a statutorily mandated duty imposed upon teachers to
protect students.' 7' The court stated that the question of primary as-
sumption of the risk turns on the nature of the activity and the relation-
ship of the parties to the activity. 72 It further stated the general rule
that in a sports setting "a co-participant may be held liable only for in-
tentional injuries or for conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside
the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport."'1 73
Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc.:74 In this tort action, the plaintiff al-
leged that the manufacturer, retailer, and school were negligent in sup-
plying a defectively designed hockey helmet and that the manufacturer
and retailer were strictly liable.' 5 The court held that the defendants
were not liable on the negligence counts because the plaintiff assumed
the risk.' 76 The evidence was sufficient to find the manufacturer and the
retailer strictly liable for defective design. 7
167. 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
168. Id. at 639.
169. Id. at 641.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 640.
172. 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640-41.
173. Id. at 643.
174. 380 N.E.2d 653 (Mass. 1978).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 653, 662.
177. Id. at 660.
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3. Defective Equipment
See Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc.,7 s discussed in Part 2, supra.
4. Medical Malpractice
Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners:179 A professional football
player brought an action against the team and physicians for fraudulent
concealment of medical information.8 0 Applying the "informed consent
doctrine," the court concluded that facts which demonstrated the team
physician failed to inform the player of the continuing risks associated
with his injuries established the requisite intent for finding of fraudulent
concealment by the team.' 8'
5. Educational Malpractice
Ross v. Creighton University:'8 2 A former student-athlete sued
Creighton University alleging, inter alia, that the institution was negli-
gent in recruiting him despite knowledge that he was unable to ade-
quately perform college work and in failing to provide him with the
support services necessary to allow him an educational opportunity.1
83
The Seventh Circuit predicted that Illinois courts would follow the rule
adopted by the majority of other courts in refusing to recognize causes of
action sounding in negligent admissions and educational malpractice.'
4
The Seventh Circuit adopted policy considerations advanced in other
courts in reaching this result, including: difficulties in developing a satis-
factory standard of care; inherent difficulties involved in determining the
cause and nature of damages; potential financial burden placed on edu-
cational institutions arising from a flood of educational malpractice law-
suits; and problems related to judicial oversight of the day-to-day
operations of schools.' 5
6. University Liability to Student-Athletes
Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College:8 6 A negligence action was
brought against a college by the parents of a former lacrosse player who
178. 380 N.E.2d 653 (Mass. 1978).
179. 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (Op. withdrawn by order of court).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 584.
182. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 412.
184. Id. at 414-15.
185. Id. at 414.
186. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d. Cir. 1993).
2001]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
suffered a fatal heart attack during practice."8 The court held that the
college owed a duty of care to take preventative measures so as to pro-
vide treatment to student-athletes in the event of an emergency. 88 The
imposition of a duty was premised largely on the special relationship be-
tween the college and the student that arises from the student-athlete
participating in a school-sponsored activity for which he has been re-
cruited by the college to play.18 9
7. Liability to Fans
Hayden v. University of Notre Dame:190 A fan, who was seated near
a football goal post, was injured following a scramble by other fans for a
ball that landed near her seat.191 The net behind the uprights failed to
prevent the ball from sailing into the seats.'9 Plaintiff alleged that the
university owed her a duty of care to protect her under these circum-
stances due to her status as an invitee.' 93 Defendant did not contest
plaintiff's invitee status. Rather the university argued that it owed no
duty to protect plaintiff from the criminal acts of third parties. 9 4 Apply-
ing a totality of the circumstances approach, the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals found that the defendant possessed a duty to protect plaintiff from
the misconduct of other fans and reversed the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of defendant. 95
E. Constitutional and Statutory Law
Traditionally, private law was viewed as providing the principal legal
mechanism for regulating the sports industries. As noted supra, labor
and antitrust law represented public law incursions into a realm deemed
best governed and regulated by private agreement. However, public law
concepts, in addition to labor and antitrust law, play an increasingly im-
portant role in governing legal relationships in sports. For example, fed-
eral legislation, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
Title LX and Title VI, holds potential to drastically reshape relationships
in sports. Moreover, constitutional principles have been called upon to
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1369, 1372.
189. Id. at 1366-69.
190. 716 N.E.2d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
191. Id. at 604.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 605.
194. Id.
195. 716 N.E.2d at 607.
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adjudicate the respective rights of parties involved in the sports world,
such as assertions that mandatory drug testing programs violate First and
Fourth Amendment rights. Constitutional law doctrines have also been
invoked to challenge NCAA eligibility rules and assertions that due pro-
cess protections have not been afforded to athletes. Illustrations of cases
in which constitutional and statutory law has been relevant include:
1. Drug Testing
Veronia School District 47J v. Acton:196 A drug policy adopted by a
school district authorized random urinalysis of students participating in
interscholastic athletics. 197 A student athletics participant and his par-
ents sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the district's enforce-
ment of its drug testing program on grounds that it violated the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the State of Oregon's constitu-
tion.19 The United States Supreme Court initially found that drug test-
ing programs such as that adopted by the district constituted a search
subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. In finding that the
drug testing policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court
focused on the lessened privacy expectation of student-athletes. 199 This
lessened expectation could be derived from the "'communal undress' in-
herent in athletic participation" and from the fact that athletes volunta-
rily subject themselves to a higher degree of regulation than students
generally. 200 This, coupled with the unobtrusive nature of the drug test-
ing program and the importance of the governmental interest at stake,
led the Court to conclude that the invasion of privacy was not significant
enough to violate the Fourth Amendment.20 '
2. Due Process
NCAA v. Tarkanian:°2 Jerry Tarkanian sued the University of Ne-
vada-Las Vegas and the NCAA alleging, among other things, that his
suspension for various recruiting and other NCAA violations abridged
his Fourteenth Amendment rights.20 3 With respect to the NCAA, the
196. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
197. Id. at 649-51.
198. Id. at 651-52.
199. Id. at 654-57.
200. Id. at 657.
201. 515 U.S. at 664-65.
202. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
203. Id. at 187-88.
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Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim holding that the NCAA, by virtue of
developing standards and rules, did not engage in state action.204
3. Racial Discrimination
Cureton v. NCAA:205 A federal district court granted summary judg-
ment on behalf of African-American student athletes who filed suit
against the NCAA.20 6 The students alleged that the minimum standard-
ized test component of "Proposition 16" initial eligibility rules violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights laws.2 °7 The Third Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's ruling that the NCAA is subject to Title VI.20 8 The Third
Circuit rejected the lower court's reasoning that the NCAA is a recipient
of federal funds because it administered the National Youth Sports Pro-
grams, which receives federal funds, and because NCAA member insti-
tutions, many of which receive federal funds, have delegated control of
their athletic programs to the NCAA.2 °9
4. Gender Discrimination (Title IX)
Cohen v. Brown University:210 Women student-athletes fied a class
action against Brown University alleging sexual discrimination in the
school's athletics programs in violation of Title ]X.211 In imposing liabil-
ity on the university, the court held that a Title IX violation occurs if an
institution "ineffectively accommodates its students' interests and abili-
ties in athletics, regardless of its performance with respect to other Title
IX areas. '212
Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n:213
Plaintiffs, consisting of female student-athletes and their parents, filed a
class action suit alleging discrimination by the Michigan High School
Athletic Association.214 The discrimination allegedly consisted, inter
alia, of providing more participation opportunities for boys than for girls,
requiring girls to play in non-traditional seasons, operating shorter sea-
sons for girls than for boys, and providing inferior athletic facilities for
204. Id. at 196-99.
205. 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
206. Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 714 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
207. 198 F.3d at 111.
208. Id. at 118.
209. Id. at 114.
210. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
211. Id. at 161.
212. Id.
213. 80 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W. D. Mich. 2000).
214. Id. at 731.
[Vol. 11:211
WHAT IS SPORTS LAW?
girls athletic tournaments in comparison to boys athletic tournaments.215
Plaintiffs claims were based on Title I, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and provisions of the Michigan Civil Rights
Act.216 The court considered whether exercising controlling authority
over a federally funded program is sufficient to trigger Title IX even if
the defendant is not a direct recipient of federal funding.2 17 Answering
this question in the affirmative, the court found that the evidence
presented a "genuine issue of material fact regarding the extent to which
the lIMSAA exerts control over interscholastic athletics. 21 8 With re-
spect to the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, the court held that the
Athletic Association is a state actor, in part, because it found that the
actions of the Association may be "fairly attributed to the state. 219
Mercer v. Duke University:22 Plaintiff asserted that Duke University
discriminated against her in its intercollegiate football program in viola-
tion of Title IX.221 In claiming a violation of Title IX, plaintiff argued
that the statute does not provide a blanket exemption for contact
sports.222 The Fourth Circuit validates the notion that single sex teams
are permitted in "contact sports" such as football.2' Nevertheless, it
held that a university may waive the exemption.224 Thus "where a uni-
versity has allowed a member of the opposite sex to try out for a single-
sex team in a contact sport, the university is... subject to Title LX and
therefore prohibited from discriminating against that individual on the
basis of his or her sex."225
Neal v. Board of Trustees:2 26 The court of appeals reversed a district
court's issuance of a preliminary injunction in favor of male athletes,
who alleged that the institution's decision to eliminate spots in the men's
wrestling program violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.227
Relying on Cohen v. Brown University, the court recognized the notion
of institutional control as it relates to granting institutions considerable
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 732.
218. 80 F.Supp.2d at 738.
219. Id. at 742.
220. 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
221. Id. at 644.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 647.
224. Id. at 647-48.
225. 190 F.3d at 644.
226. 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999).
227. Id. at 765.
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deference in determining how to achieve gender proportionality, includ-
ing reducing men's athletic opportunities. After reviewing existing pre-
cedent, the court noted that
[e]very [court of appeals], in construing the Policy Interpretation
and the text of Title IX, has held that a university may bring itself
into Title IX compliance by increasing athletic opportunities for
the underrepresented gender (women in this case) or by decreas-
ing athletic opportunities for the over-represented gender (men in
this case). . 228
5. Disability
Knapp v. Northwestern University:229 Northwestern University de-
clared a student-athlete permanently medically ineligible to play on or
practice with its intercollegiate basketball team because of a cardiac con-
dition that could be exacerbated by such participation."20 The athlete
sued the university alleging that its refusal to permit him to play violated
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.211 Reversing the district court,
the Court of Appeals held, as a matter of law, that plaintiff's cardiovas-
cular impairment did not render him "disabled" within the Rehabilita-
tion Act. According to the court, "[a]n impairment that interferes with
an individual's ability to obtain a satisfactory education otherwise, does
not substantially limit the major life activity of learning. . .Because
learning through playing intercollegiate basketball is only one part of the
education available to Knapp at Northwestern, even under a subjective
standard, Knapp's ability to learn is not substantially limited."2' 2 In so
ruling, the court emphasized that Northwestern would permit Knapp to
have access to all of the academic and nonacademic services and activi-
ties it offered with the exception of basketball.
F. Other Substantive Areas
In addition to the forgoing, legal practice in the sports context may
require familiarity with additional substantive areas of the law including:
agency, criminal law, tax, real estate, intellectual property, professional
responsibility, entertainment and communications law.
228. Id. at 769-770.
229. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
230. Id. at 476-77.
231. Id. at 477-78.
232. Id. at 481.
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IV. PRACTICING LAW IN TH= SPORTS CONTEXT 33
Practice for the attorney involved in the business of sports can be
varied and substantively rich. As discussed above, the practice of law in
the sports realm encompasses virtually every substantive area of the law.
Thus the sports law attorney can be viewed as the "ultimate general
practitioner" given the broad array of legal subjects that must be mas-
tered.234 In addition, the functions that can be served by the sports law-
yer are likely to vary. "The sports lawyer may serve a transactional
function,1 5 a litigation function,236 or some hybrid combination of both.
In all capacities, an intimate knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of this rela-
tively new enterprise is essential." 7 This certainly belies the idea of
many law students, novice practitioners and lay persons who equate the
practice of sports law to the representation of players in their contract
negotiations. Agent representation of players, though perceived as
glamorous, exciting and fast paced, represents a negligible part of the
functions and opportunities that attorneys may be called upon to per-
form in the business of sports"3 Nevertheless, I begin with a discussion
of the various services that the athlete agent may perform for his or her
client.
233. Useful discussions of the nature of sports law practice may be found in the following:
Walter T. Champion, Jr., Attorneys Qua Sports Agents: An Ethical Conundrum, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 349, 351-52 (1997); Garbarino, supra note 51, at 14; KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE,
CAREERS IN SPORTS LAW (1990); and Tulane Law School, What Do Sports Lawyers Do?, at
http://www.law.tulane.edu/admitibrochure/sportslpage2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001).
234. Greenberg, supra note 19, at vii; GARY A. UBERSTINE, Preface to 1 LAW OF PROFES-
SIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, at xv (Gary A. Uberstine ed. 1997).
235. Elaborating on the transactional capacity in which the sports lawyer may serve, the
authors state: "sports counsel are often called upon not only to advise clients regarding the
legal sufficiency of a particular contract, plan of action, or other non-litigation strategy, but
also to provide insights and guidance regarding the business ramifications of a particular
course of action." COzzILLIO & LEVINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 8.
236. In regard to the litigation function of the sports lawyer, the authors state: "the sports
litigator who is well-versed in the most subtle aspects of a client's operation vill be able to
draw effectively on that experience to highlight similarities or distinctions between the case at
bar and other precedent. The probability of success in a particular case will be substantially
enhanced if the litigator is able to share with the court special knowledge of the factual set-
tings in which a dispute arose or unique facets of the controversy that justify the relief sought
or defenses offered." Id. at 7.
237. Id.
238. TIMOTHY DAvis, ET AL., SPORTS AND THE LAW: A MODERN ANTHOLOGY 145
(Timothy Davis et al., eds., 1999).
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A. Representing Athletes
The role of agents extends beyond the commonly held belief that
their job is to negotiate a contract with a club. These functions were
recently described as including the following:
contract negotiations, tax planing, financial planning, money man-
agement, investments, estate planning, income tax preparation,
incorporating the client, endorsements, sports medicine consulta-
tions, physical health consultations, post-career development, ca-
reer and personal development counseling, legal consultations
and insurance matters.239
The diverse nature of the services that athlete agents perform is indica-
tive of the broad array of professional services and substantive expertise
required of attorneys who represent others involved in the sports indus-
try. A brief summary of services that might be performed on behalf of
certain participants in the business of sports is provided below.
B. Representing Coaches
Increasingly, coaches seek professional representation. In this con-
text, the lawyer may be called upon to perform numerous tasks, includ-
ing: negotiating and drafting employment contracts on behalf of coaches
with their teams, both professional and collegiate; negotiating and draft-
ing endorsement contracts with merchandisers such as shoe and apparel
manufacturers, as well as with television and radio stations; and, repre-
senting coaches in team and league related disputes.240
C. Acting as Counsel for a Major or Minor League Sports League or
an Individual Team
Apart from negotiating contracts with individual players, the lawyer
who acts as counsel for a team or league will need to negotiate contracts
with employees including coaches and administrative staff. The attorney
who acts in this capacity may serve multiple other functions including:
negotiating lease agreements relating to sports venues and construction
related contracts; negotiating endorsement contracts with sports mer-
chandisers; negotiating television and radio contracts; supervising labor,
tort, antitrust, breach of contract and other types of litigation; interpret-
ing and applying collective bargaining agreements; managing player
239. Champion, supra note 233, at 351-52.
240. Ilane Law School, supra note 233.
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grievances relating to collective bargaining agreements; and, represent-
ing teams in legal matters involving leagues and vice-versa.24'
D. Representing Educational Institutions
Attorneys working within this aspect of the sports industry will also
be called upon to represent their clients in broad and varied ways, in-
cluding: representing colleges and universities in negotiating and enforc-
ing employment contracts with coaches, athletic directors and other
athletic related administrators and personnel; representing colleges and
universities in lawsuits addressing such matters as compliance with
NCAA rules and regulations and Title IX compliance; representing a
university with respect to facility agreements and negotiating marketing
related contracts; developing, protecting and enforcing intellectual prop-
erty rights; acting as a compliance officer within a university's athletic
department; representing secondary school districts in litigation related
matters such as those involving tort liability, Title IX, and the American
with Disabilities Act; and, developing and providing risk management
advice to school districts.242
E. Representing Sports Facilities
The attorney who represents a sports facility may be called upon to
perform a range of services, including: negotiating and monitoring con-
tracts with teams, concessionaires, governmental authorities and con-
tractors; and representing or supervising outside counsel in litigation
relating to matters such as tort liability stemming from injury to specta-
tors, ADA disputes and breach of contract.243
F. Other Areas of Representation
Apart from the areas identified above, the attorney who practices in
the sports law context may provide services including: representing ath-
letes engaged in individual sports; representing promoters of various
types of sports related events including boxing, tennis and golf tourna-
ments and college football bowl games; representing national and inter-
national federations and other bodies that govern sports such as the
PGA, and the International or US Olympic Committees; and represent-
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journalists and broadcasters, as well as their employers) and organiza-
tions that seek commercial endorsements from sports figures.2'
V. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this paper, I asked if the question regarding
sports law's character as a separate discipline is merely a matter of aca-
demic curiosity. No doubt, some will say the debate is only relevant to
academics. Such a conclusion, however, may be too myopic. As alluded
to above, such an attitude fails to recognize that the development of
sports law can be viewed as evidence of the transformation of relation-
ships in the sports context.
In a more fundamental sense, however, perhaps the significance of
whether sports law is a field of practice may lie in the perceptions of
those of us who practice, study or write in the area. Do we perceive
ourselves as engaged in an important, rigorous, intellectually stimulating
area of practice and study? Moreover, do we view our endeavors as
worthy of the respect of our colleagues who are engaged in other fields
of practice? In short, perhaps the relevance of the question resides in
whether we feel that we can take pride in working in an area that is
respected as having substantive value and is considered a vital part of the
legal community.
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